Eva KittayとMichael Berube：障害のある子どもを持つ学者からのSinger批判
今回、ここに引っ張ってきたKittay氏とBerube氏の発言3点は、いずれも哲学的な議論であり、
私には取りまとめるだけの背景知識がないため（しかも、正直いずれも長すぎる……）、
日本語にすることを控え、英文のまま紹介するに留めます。ご了解ください。
私には取りまとめるだけの背景知識がないため（しかも、正直いずれも長すぎる……）、
日本語にすることを控え、英文のまま紹介するに留めます。ご了解ください。
Eva Kittay 氏の来日講演について知ったのを機に、昨日のエントリーで紹介した、
08年9月のStony Brook大学の「認知障害：道徳哲学へのチャレンジ」カンファにおけるSingerのプレゼンに対する
What Sorts of People におけるRob Wilson氏の批判ポストへのEva Kittay氏のコメントの全文を以下に。
08年9月のStony Brook大学の「認知障害：道徳哲学へのチャレンジ」カンファにおけるSingerのプレゼンに対する
What Sorts of People におけるRob Wilson氏の批判ポストへのEva Kittay氏のコメントの全文を以下に。
（ややこしくて、すみません。なんのこっちゃ？という方は 上記昨日のエントリーをご参照ください）
December 16, 2008 at 5:55 pm
I first of all want to thank everyone at What Sorts of People for expanding the discussion of the issues raised at the Conference I and Licia Carlson organized. We organized the conference precisely to give an airing to philosophical questions that concern cognitive disabilities of different sorts and to demonstrate the deep philosophical challenges posed by the issue of cognitive disability. Creating this space allows a public engagement of these issues in a still larger forum than a conference. I expect I will frequently be tempted to join in on the discussion.
Now for a comment on Bob’s response to the Singer clip. I have long had a disagreement with Singer on many points concerning people with cognitive disabilities, but two of the points that Bob makes have been especially disturbing to me. The first is the easy slide between the kinds and levels of cognitive disability he (and others who take similar positions) make. The threshold of functioning is somewhere below “normal” ― defined sometimes by IQ, sometimes by functioning that is considered as typically human, sometimes by reference to nonhuman animals (which can run the gammet from primates to pigs to rats). Where the arguments seem to require it, we are to be thinking of human beings who are barely conscious. Yet without changing the terms of the argument, we are given examples of people whose cognitive disabilities are rather mild.
I think that two things lie behind these elisions: The first is the unstated view that anything below normal cognitive functioning is a sufficiently severe disability to make that life questionable. The second is a thick layer of ignorance about the lives and functioning of people with cognitive disabilities of any sort. In short it is never quite clear who is being talked about, in large part because Singer and others keep their philosophy insulated from these particular empirical matters.
Which leads me directly to the second point that so disturbs me. In a recent interchange with Michael Berube, Singer expressed his delight to hear about all the things that Jaime is capable of, yet he wonders if Jaime is not an anomaly. There is now so much literature out there attesting to the sorts of things people with Down’s are capable of, one has to wonder why Singer expresses any surprise about the abilities Jamie manifests. After all, cognitive disability is something Singer writes about regularly. One would assume that he keeps up with the changing understandings. At the conference I invited Singer to pay a visit to a wonderful community where my daughter (who is among the more significantly cognitively impaired individuals that Singer frequently targets) resides. (Indeed I had brought a majority of the speakers there on the morning of the first day of the conference, but Singer declined that first invitation.) He wanted to know what he might (given his argurment) learn from visiting such a place. [would it be possible to show that clip--it comes at the very beginning of the Singer Q&A.] Perhaps that is a fair enough question, but I would think that the responsible thing to do would be to jump at the opportunity to become better acquainted with the subject of one’s perennial teaching and research interest. I don’t understand the willingness to remain insulated from such knowledge, and I don’t understand why we (philosophers) tolerate this willful ignorance. We do not tolerate philosophers of science who know very little about the science they write about. Why do we tolerate ethicists talking about people they know so little about?
Eva Kittay
I first of all want to thank everyone at What Sorts of People for expanding the discussion of the issues raised at the Conference I and Licia Carlson organized. We organized the conference precisely to give an airing to philosophical questions that concern cognitive disabilities of different sorts and to demonstrate the deep philosophical challenges posed by the issue of cognitive disability. Creating this space allows a public engagement of these issues in a still larger forum than a conference. I expect I will frequently be tempted to join in on the discussion.
Now for a comment on Bob’s response to the Singer clip. I have long had a disagreement with Singer on many points concerning people with cognitive disabilities, but two of the points that Bob makes have been especially disturbing to me. The first is the easy slide between the kinds and levels of cognitive disability he (and others who take similar positions) make. The threshold of functioning is somewhere below “normal” ― defined sometimes by IQ, sometimes by functioning that is considered as typically human, sometimes by reference to nonhuman animals (which can run the gammet from primates to pigs to rats). Where the arguments seem to require it, we are to be thinking of human beings who are barely conscious. Yet without changing the terms of the argument, we are given examples of people whose cognitive disabilities are rather mild.
I think that two things lie behind these elisions: The first is the unstated view that anything below normal cognitive functioning is a sufficiently severe disability to make that life questionable. The second is a thick layer of ignorance about the lives and functioning of people with cognitive disabilities of any sort. In short it is never quite clear who is being talked about, in large part because Singer and others keep their philosophy insulated from these particular empirical matters.
Which leads me directly to the second point that so disturbs me. In a recent interchange with Michael Berube, Singer expressed his delight to hear about all the things that Jaime is capable of, yet he wonders if Jaime is not an anomaly. There is now so much literature out there attesting to the sorts of things people with Down’s are capable of, one has to wonder why Singer expresses any surprise about the abilities Jamie manifests. After all, cognitive disability is something Singer writes about regularly. One would assume that he keeps up with the changing understandings. At the conference I invited Singer to pay a visit to a wonderful community where my daughter (who is among the more significantly cognitively impaired individuals that Singer frequently targets) resides. (Indeed I had brought a majority of the speakers there on the morning of the first day of the conference, but Singer declined that first invitation.) He wanted to know what he might (given his argurment) learn from visiting such a place. [would it be possible to show that clip--it comes at the very beginning of the Singer Q&A.] Perhaps that is a fair enough question, but I would think that the responsible thing to do would be to jump at the opportunity to become better acquainted with the subject of one’s perennial teaching and research interest. I don’t understand the willingness to remain insulated from such knowledge, and I don’t understand why we (philosophers) tolerate this willful ignorance. We do not tolerate philosophers of science who know very little about the science they write about. Why do we tolerate ethicists talking about people they know so little about?
Eva Kittay
この中で触れられているMichael Berube氏というのは上記カンファのスピーカーの一人で、
Penn State大学の米文学と障害学の教授。
Penn State大学の米文学と障害学の教授。
カンファにはダウン症の息子Jamieさんを含む一家みんなで出かけ、
Singer氏のプレゼンは、Jamieさんと一緒に聞いたという。
Singer氏へのQ&Aでは発言の機会がなかったが、
重症の認知障害のある人にも道徳的地位を認めるべきだと考えるに足る
説得力ある議論は未だかつて出てきていないと主張したMcMahan氏のプレゼンでは、Q&Aで反論もした。
Singer氏のプレゼンは、Jamieさんと一緒に聞いたという。
Singer氏へのQ&Aでは発言の機会がなかったが、
重症の認知障害のある人にも道徳的地位を認めるべきだと考えるに足る
説得力ある議論は未だかつて出てきていないと主張したMcMahan氏のプレゼンでは、Q&Aで反論もした。
そして2人のプレゼンについて、自身のブログ American Airspaceで批判を展開した。その時のポストが以下。
すると、思いがけないことに、数日後に彼のところにSinger自身からメールが届いた。
そして何度かメールのやり取りをしたというもの。その続報ポストが以下。
（Singerへの最初の返信が掲載されています）
そして何度かメールのやり取りをしたというもの。その続報ポストが以下。
（Singerへの最初の返信が掲載されています）
